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Respondent's Brief makes evident the reason it asked the 
United States District Court to remand this case, and then delayed 
once it returned here: Respondent apparently believes it can 
persuade this Court to construct special new rules--of waiver, 
non-retroactivity, and harmless error in capital sentencing--to 
deny these two Petitioners, and them alone, the protections of the 
sentencing standard announced in State v. wood. In case it cannot, 
Respondent has sponsored legislation which would permit 
resentencing in capital cases, got it passed while this case was 
pending, 1 and now asks the Court to create another exception, 
specially for this case, and permit these two men to be resentenced 
under that new statute. 
Petitioner prays this Court will not be persuaded, with life 
at stake, to carve out such ad hoc exceptions to the rule of law. 
The size of Respondent's Brief should not be mistaken for 
substance. For all its length, it cites no authority anywhere that 
contravenes the clear, controlling precedents Petitioner has 
presented. Its arguments are based on distortions of the facts, 
and misconstruction of the law. 
1 Respondent falsely says this case was brought after the 
February 16, 1982 passage of SB 60. RP 85. 
- 1 -
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I. THE ISSUES HERE HAVE NEVER BEEN WAIVED. 
Though it was at Respondent's insistence this Petition was 
filed, its first argument now is that it should be dismissed. 
Ignoring the facts of record in this Court, Respondent now says the 
issues here have not been raised before, and are waived. 
When Petitioner raised the burden of proof argument on direct 
appeal, Respondent made no waiver claim, and this Court considered 
and rejected it on its merits. State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d 709, 710 
(Utah 1977)1 see Brief of Respondent, State v. Andrews No. 13902 at 
12. 2 when Petitioner again challenged the burden of proof at 
sentencing in his Postconviction Petition, Respondent said his 
"arguments [were] ••• very similar as to the direct appeal" and 
should be rejected for that reason. See Transcript of Proceedings, 
Andrews v. Morris, Third District No. C-78-7126, attached as 
Appendix A-1. The District Court so found and dismissed, and on 
appeal from that dismissal this Court agreed: "the standard of 
proof issue was raised on direct appeal in Pierre• and the 
Postconviction Petitions "simply reframed the same issues.• Pierre 
v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812, 814, 813 (Utah 1980)1 accord Andrews v. 
2 petitioner has not attached copies of documents previously 
filed by the parties in this case in this Court, because he assumes 
they are part of the Court's records. Of course, he will supply 
them on request. 
- 2 -
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Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 819 and n.9 (Utah 1980).3 
Respondent now asks this Court to reverse itself, rewrite this 
history, and hold this claim has somehow been waived--not because 
of any rule of procedure violated by Petitioner's court-appointed 
counsel, but because of minor differences in the specific terms of 
the burden of proof arguments in Pierre and wood. 
Certainly, the Pierre argument Petitioner adopted was not 
directed specifically at the relative weight of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, because it was "in that case (State v. 
Pierre) the court first established that the burden of proof in 
capital cases is that 'the totality of aggravating circumstances 
must ••• outweigh the totality of mitigating circumstances.'" 
Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Rehearing at 21, Andrews v. 
Morris, No. 16168. Despite that--and despite the fact that "[t]he 
signals from ••• [the Supreme] Court have not always been easy 
to decipher," Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978), so "there 
has developed a great deal of consternation and confusion about the 
death penalty," State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah 1977)--
3 As Respondent notes, Pierre and Andrews took different 
approaches in their postconviction appeals. Andrews' arguments 
focused on intervening changes in the case law and governing 
constitutional principles, not the merits of the various issues his 
petition raised. Andrews v. Morris, supra, 607 P.2d at 822-24. 
Several of the cases he cited formed the basis of the decision in 
State v. wood. See id. at 11-15. Pierre's postconviction argument 
went directly to the-i:iurden of proof issue in the same terms it was 
decided in wood. Pierre v. Morris, supra, 607 P.2d at 814-15; see 
Resp.Br. at--,-0:- Neither approach succeeded. 
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Pierre's burden of proof argument more closely approximated the 
decision in Wood than did Wood's argument itself.4 Even more 
importantly--though Respondent neglects to mention it--the Court in 
Pierre, and in Andrews, plainly understood and addressed that 
argument in its most general terms. See Pet.Br. at 2. 
At all times before this Court, Petitioner has attempted to 
abide by its rules and couch his arguments in terms consistent with 
the law of this state. No issue has ever been deliberately 
withheld or "sandbagged" in this case.5 The burden of proof 
issue was raised in the clearest terms possible, and fully 
considered, on the direct appeal. There has been no waiver here. 
II. NO AUTHORITY SUPPORTS RESPONDENT'S NON-RETROACTIVITY ARGUMENT. 
The single, dispositive question here is whether the rule of 
wood should be given limited, prospective application, contrary to 
the general rule that judicial interpretations of the law are 
retroactive. For all its verbiage and scattershot case citations, 
4 Respondent falsely says Wood couched his argument in the same 
terms this Court decided it. Resp.Br. at 34. In fact, Wood 
challenged the Utah statute for "failing to require proof of 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt• and argued 
"the state should bear the burden of proving that the aggra~ating 
circumstances are of such proportion that the mitigating 
circumstances do not constitute a reasonable or substantial doubt 
on the question of imposing a sentence of death." Brief of 
Appellant at 20, 23, State v. Wood, No.16486 (Appendix B). 
5 Respondent's constant attempts to label virtually anything 
counsel does as a waiver for which Petitioner should pay with his 
life (e.g., Resp.Br. at 25n.11) are as baseless as they are 
vicious. If the Court has any doubt of this, Petitioner would ask 
for the opportunity to establish it at a hearing. 
- 4 -
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Respondent gives no sound reason such an exception should be made 
here, and points to no case anywhere which has so limited a 
decision changing the burden of proof in a criminal case. 
A9 Respondent's inability to find a contrary example confirms, 
burden of proof decisions are universally held retroactive. And 
because such decisions relate to the truth-finding function, they 
are retroactive regardless of any reliance or their impact on the 
administration of justice. 
"Neither good-faith reliance by the state or federal 
authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted 
practice, nor severe impact on the administration of 
justice has sufficed to require prospective application 
in these circumstances." Williams v. United States, 401 
U.S. 646, 653, 28 L.Ed.2d 388, 91 s.ct. 1148 (1971) •••• 
Ivan v. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 202, 204-205 (1972). The 
same rule applies whether or not the burden of proof decision is 
constitutionally compelled. See, e.g., State v. Humphries, 364 
N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio 1977), cited in Engle v. Isaac, U.S. , 31 
Cr.L. 3001, 3003 (April 5, 1982). Thus the Court n.eed not decide 
in this case that issue, which it declined to reach in Wood. 6 
If it did, Petitioner would argue that Wood's sentencing 
standard is constitutionally required, at least under this statute, 
for all the reasons given in the Pierre argument and in State v. 
wood, supra, at 11-15. But whether it is based in the constitution 
or statutory interpretation, its retroactivity is required because 
6 Respondent falsely suggests wood held.the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard was not constitutionally compelled. Resp.Br. at 
21-23. In fact, the Court in~ clearly left that issue open. 
See State v. wood, supra, at 13. 
- r:;. -
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it directly relates to the truth-finding function at the most 
critical phase of the most serious kind of criminal trial.7 
Even if the issue here did not involve the burden of proof, 
there would be no valid reason here to depart from the general rule 
of retroactivity. Respondent has pointed to no considerations of 
reliance or the affect on the administration of justice which would 
justify giving Wood limited, prospective application. Only one 
death sentence has been imposed under jury instructions derived 
from Pierre: that sentence, which is pending before the Court in 
State v. Heber Norton, will have to be reversed under any accepted 
retroactivity jurisprudence, because it is still on appeal. 
The only affect of Wood's total retroactivity would be the 
reversal of the two remaining death sentences imposed under a 
different standard: those of Petitioner and his co-defendant. To 
refuse to apply a uniform legal standard because of the impact of 
reversing one case on "the administration of justice" would amount 
to nothing more or less than judicial discrimination. 
For our system of justice to command the respect of 
society, the law must be applied, in all cases, in a 
judicious and even-handed manner. 
State v. wood, supra at 11. Petitioner cannot believe this Court 
will accept Respondent's invitation to forget that here. 
7 Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1977) ~nvolved no similar 
issues. See 387 so.2d at 924. Moreover, Witt appears to have been 
overruled by Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1981), 
vacated on other grounds 50 u.s.L.W. 3981 (1982). 
- 6 -
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III. THE QUESTION OF HARMLESS ERROR. 
Respondent appears to admit that errors in setting the burden 
of proof at the guilt phase of trial cannot be harmless (Resp.Br. 
at 70), but turns the constitution on its head by arguing such 
errors in capital sentencing proceedings can. At least, the 
sentencing determination in a capital trial is entitled to no less 
constitutional respect than a determination of guilt or innocence. 
See Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1862 (1981). The basic 
protections of due process apply to death sentencing proceedings. 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)1 State v. Wood, supra. 
Like a guilt determination, a sentencing verdict cannot be affirmed 
on appeal on a ground substantially different from that on which 
the jury reached it. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978). 
If there is any constitutional difference between these two 
types of verdicts, it is that errors in death sentencing 
proceedings are more serious than errors in guilt trials, not less. 
Death in its finality, differs from life imprisonment more 
than a hundred-year prison term differs from one of only a 
year or two. Because of that quantitative difference, 
there is a corresponding difference in the need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment in a specific case. 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). Moreover, the 
necessarily subjective nature of the penalty determination makes it 
i1apo8sible for a reviewing court to determine precisely what factor 
tipped the balance. 
The ultimate purpose in the penalty phase is not one of 
fact finding, but the fixing.of a penalty, and the fixing 
of a penalty is a matter of Judgment about what penal 
consequences should attach to the commission of a capital 
crime by a particular defendant. 
- 7 -
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State v. Wood, supra, at 16. No reviewing court can ever state 
with certainty what the result would have been had that judgment 
been instructed by wholly different standards. 
Even if an error in setting a death sentencing standard could 
be held harmless in some case, it could not be here. No one else 
has yet been sentenced to death under the wood standard, regardless 
of the severity of aggravation or the paucity of mitigation. There 
is no principled way this Court can say William Andrews would have 
been. There is no way on this record this Court can know how many 
of the statutory aggravating circumstances this jury found.a And 
despite Respondent's attempt to deny them, there clearly was 
evidence from which the jury could have found at least four 
8 contrary to Respondent's assertions (Resp.Br. at 3n.2), four of 
the eight statutory aggravating circumstances listed in UCA 
76-5-202 (§§ (a), (e), (g) and (h)) were supported by no evidence 
whatsoever as to either defendant, and were not submitted by the 
trial court. Several of those that were submitted were subject to 
substantial doubt, at least as to Andrews. Certainly, there was no 
evidence whatever William Andrews was engaged "in the commission of 
••• rape" UCA 76-5-202(1)(d). Andrews clearly was gone before any 
rape took place. T.Tr. 3184. There was also no evidence Andrews 
himself "committed another homicide" (UCA 76-5-202(b)), though the 
trial court expanded this aggravating circumstance in its "parties" 
instruction. See Court's Instruction on Guilt, No. 8. The trial 
court's theory of "personal gain" under UCA 76-5-202(1)(g) was 
supported by evidence primarily relating to Pierre, not Andrews. 
See ibid.7 T.Tr 3091. And any theory of 0 pecuniary gain" would 
involve the same evidence as the aggravating circumstance of 
robbery. That evidence, at most, could support one additional 
aggravating factor. Provence v. State, 337 So.2d 783, 786 (Fla. 
1976), cert denied 431 U.S. 969 (1977); Enmund v. State, 399 So.2d 
1362, 1373 (Fla. 1981), reversed on other grounds 50 u.s.L.W. 5087 
(1982). Cf. State v. Cherry, 257 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1979). 
- 8 -
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statutory mitigating circumstances9--and substantial non-
statutory mitigation as well.10 
The jury deliberated on this sentence for over two hours. 
T.Tr. 4304-6. No one knows, or can know, what it believed, what it 
rejected, and how it weighed the facts it found in reaching its 
decision. This is not a matter about which appellate courts can 
simply speculate: "the reasoning of the plurality opinion in 
9 Even Respondent admits Andrews' criminal record was "not 
extensive" (Resp.Br. at 4n.2). Andrews was 19 at the time of this 
crime. Respondent's attempt to deny the jury could have found that 
mitigating ignores the meaning of the word "youth", and the 
constitutional prohibition against limiting its scope--and 
contrasts sharply with the public pronouncements of the Attorney 
General who prosecuted this appeal that John Michael Calhoun's 
"tender age" of 18 1/2 should preclude his death sentence for the 
cold blooded murder of two people. Salt Lake Tribune, April 18, 
1980, B8:1. 
Respondent's denial that Andrews' participation in these killings 
was minor relative to Pierre's ignores the fact--conveniently 
omitted from its summary of the evidence--that Andrews was not 
present when any of the killings took place. T.Tr 3188. Its 
denial that there was any evidence Andrews was dominated by Pierre 
ignores the testimony of Orren Walker that Andrews "was disturbed 
during the whole evening• (T.Tr. 3176-7), protested when Pierre 
first fired his gun, apparently argued with Pierre, and was twice 
heard to say "I can't do it, I'm scared." T.Tr. 3073, 3091, 3183. 
There remains real doubt William Andrews' participation in this 
crime was sufficient to support a death sentence. See Enmund v. 
Florida, 50 u.s.L.W. 5087 (June 2, 1982). At the least, it was a 
fact which was constitutionally required to be considered in 
mitigation. See id. at 50 u.s.L.W. 5093ff (concurring opinion of 
Justice O'Connor)-.-
10 Andrews' impoverished and deprived childhood and background 
--which is undisputed and acknowledged even by Respondent's summary 
of the facts--was a factor the jury was constitutionally required 
to take into consideration in mitigation, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 50 
u.s.L.W. 4161 (January 19, 1982), though it was not listed in the 
statute. 
- 9 -
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Lockett compels a reversal so ••• not [to] 'risk that the death 
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a 
less severe penalty.' 438 U.S., at 605." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
supra, 50 u.s.L.W. at 4165 (concurring opinion of Justice 
O'Connor). The error in this sentencing instruction requires 
reversal. See State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980). 
IV. TO CREATE UNIQUE LEGAL RULES FOR THIS CASE WOULD BE TO PERMIT 
ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. 
Respondent wholly misconstrues the discrimination claim made 
here. Petitioner has not--out of respect to this Court's rules--
reraised the same allegations of arbitrariness and discrimination 
rejected in Andrews v. Morris, supra, 607 P.2d at 825. The claim 
here is more limited: it is that the affirmance of the death 
sentences in this case, under a sentencing standard different from 
that applied in all others, would inject an additional element of 
arbitrariness and discrimination into this case, and separately 
violate the Constitution. 
This claim is predictive1 but it is not general. To single 
out two men for special, unequal treatment under an unaltered 
statute, would create an arbitrariness and an equal protection 
denial not based on statistics, but on specific acts directed 
toward those individuals. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 
(1~77). The fact those same two men are the only two blacks 
sentenced under this statute would raise a serious inference of 
discrimination. See Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 858, 859 (11th Cir. 
1982). But regardless of race, it would violate the Constitution 
to "permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly 
- 10 -
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imposed.• Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972)(concurring 
opinion of Justice Stewart). 
Petitioner hopes and believes this Court will not permit that 
and will reject Respondent's attempts to make special rules for 
this case on their merits. He raises this issue now only because 
the rules of exhaustion--and the unyielding barrage of waiver 
arguments he has been subjected to--force him to spell out all 
constitutional objections he would have to a contrary result. That 
result, and this issue, should never be reached. 
V. THIS CASE CANNOT BE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. 
The law in effect at the time of the trial in this case--like 
the law in effect at the time of Walter Wood and Gerald Paul Brown 
--did not provide for new sentencing proceedings on remand of a 
capital case. UCA 76-3-207(3) (Supp. 1974). While it delayed this 
litigation, Respondent prevailed upon the legislature to pass a new 
statute, which permits such resentencing on retrial. See Resp.Br. 
at 85. That statute does not contain any express.declaration it 
should be applied retroactively. Under the law of this state, it 
should have no effect on either this case or this petition, both of 
which long preceded its effective date. As Petitioner has 
previously argued in his responding memorandum, to hold otherwise 
would violate not only that clear state law, but the ex post facto 
and bill of attainder clauses of the Constitution. For all those 
reasons, this last ditch effort to create yet another special set 
of rules for this case should be rejected by this Court. 
- 11 -
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This should not be a difficult case. After careful and 
extensive deliberation, for sound and humane reasons, this Court 
has i~terpreted Utah's capital punishment statute to include a 
sentencing standard appropriate to nthe gravity of the decision to 
be made and the constitutional environment in which that decision 
must be made." State v. Wood, supra, at 14. That standard clearly 
was not followed in William Andrews case. Andrews' counsel 
challenged the standard that was applied on direct appeal. William 
Andrews should not be consigned to his death simply because that 
appeal came too soon. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Timothy K. Ford 
Attorney for William Andrews 
- 1~ -
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.. 1 that issue ...... · ;_. 
2 ·' _, .. _ As to 12-A, he said, again, fairly represent.ing 
3 the situation, that the arguccnts are very similar as to the · 
' direct· appeaL ·· :;::.. ~ ~· . 
5 
6 
7 
8. 
9 
10 
.11 
12 
13 
.15 
,16 
17 
18 
.19 
20 
·As to ·12-B, 'be talks about the pattem of impositic n 
of the death penalty and endeavored to indicate that that was 
·the reason that the Dunsdon case was continued and have had 
that matter already resolved. that that was not the reason: 
·for that and I would point out with respect to the fact that 
that's not a new issue, that on page eight of the Andrews' 
Amended Petition, unlike the Petition for Habeas Corpus in 
Pierre which does not specifically set forth the time periods 
but which obviously are applicable as to both cases, it reads 
as follows:· "The pattern of imposition of· the death penalty 
in Utah and in the United States sinc·e the enactment in .July, 
1973, of the •tatutory system under which petitioner was 
sentenced, shows that the sentence of death is being imposed 
so rarely and arbitrarily and discriminatorily against the 
poor and .outcast whose alleged victi11B,are white, aa to 
separately ·violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment prin~ 
21 ciples of Furman v. Georgia. Since .July, 1973, dozens of 
22 persons in Utah and hundreds of persons in the United States 
.23. have been ~onvicted of homicides committed under circumstancet 
24 which would make them capital under the goveming State 
_25 statutes;·'petitioner b one of. the tiny minority· of these, 
26 choaen randomly at best and discriminatorily at worst, who 
I ~27' baa actually been sentenced to death as a result of such con-
l t. ~...,. .. - ... i .. ; .... . .. t .t .. • • .... ~ 
29 
30 
'"". Now~. Your Honor, more than three years after the 
time that this eo-called pattern began in July of 1973, these 
20 
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:,t.\.. • 
IN nit DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT 1:AKE ~~OUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM ANDREWS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
ON ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR RABE.AS 
CORPUS 
LAWRENCE MORRIS. Warden of 
the U~ah St_ate Prison, CASE NO. 78- 7126 
Respondent. 
In support of its order. dated November 30, 1978, gr~nting 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition and denying the Motion 
by Petitioner. for a stay of execution, the Court now makes the 
following findings and con~lusions: 
1. No developments of fact or law material .to the deter~ 
mination of the legality and.constitutionality of the conviction·• 
and sentence of the Petitioner herein have occurred since the 
filing of Petitioner's direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court 
and that Court's decision on that appeal. 
2. All the issues ·regarding the constitutionality of 
the processes for death se!1tencing under Utah law., the constitution-
_alit:y of the death sentences in P_etitioner' s case, and the effect 
of any alleged prejudicial publici.t:y Or.J:?!'!:.uerices. ·on PeJ:Jf-ione:r' s 
. . • . . ,t·1 (/'1--.-</tl _t~ .. . A..P,~../)~ ~....?· .. 
t=ial ~nich are raised by this Petition ,re the same issu~s th~t 
Petitioner raised in his direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Cou:t.· 
---·· . ------
3. Petitioner's claim that Utah 1 s. death penalty la~ · 
is being applied arbitrarily and d_iscriminatorily fails to stat:e. 
a clai:n on which relief could be granted or on ~hich a heari~~ 
... . • zi.:t.1.~,:,<..(."c. ~ .. ,-:<..-f-/ ? ..,,.,, /'~.~:··~ _;..C~-c...N 
need b,e peld, ?'Ht.'J..L-··X-L+ 1 ~ ~t.-:.:e..e r ~=-~,, .... /~ 7J~ 
~ &e..1--..i..d' ·""-'"-' ~ -~~-1:.,. /.----' • d /" 4. Constitutional issues identical to those raise 
a~~ ciec~ded on di~ect appeal cannot be raised again in collateral 
A - 4 f 
i 
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5. Constitutional challenges to the pattern of ap-
plic~ion of e criminal statute or the excessiveness of a criminal 
sentence 'Which 'Were no1;· .but could have been raised on direct . 
a;>peal c:a::mot be .raised thro~g~collateral proceedings. . . 
DATED: December £, 1978. · 
ATTEST. 
·STERLING EVANS 
lerk 
·- .... 
STATE O"' \ITAH · (. 
. ·.:• 
CO\.'N':"V 01" ..._&.TI.AKE.(~ ,, •. 
1. Tt-<~ UNDGl'SIGNED. CLERK o;, THE 01sTRlCT 
CO\JRT OF SALT s:..AK£ cou .. TY. UTAH. '00 ~t:,tE•~ 
CERTIFY TH"'T" THE ANNEXEl:I° AND F'OSS.t'C.i;ING ~· 
A TJl\11£ AND F'UL.L. C:.OPV OF AN OP.ICINt,:., D()CU •• 
MENTON F-11 .. E·u· MV ·o,.,.•e& As sucH CLE'PIK. 
WITNE'SS -MY .HAND~ a£AL. OF SAID ·~"T 
TMIS ~y .Of! -~ ~ _.st~· 
W. 5TEFI ING r:tl~'":,'*'C/"-~ •• · ·• . . • • 
WY " ~ DE~~ -~ 
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Offe"" 0 e .; n e'V'ch:inge -Fer h; ~ ... ~s ... ; .,...,..""'" ; ~ ~.-:. .... .: L t th c 
....... - ·~ .... .. -oJ ... _ --·~··.i , - .... ...... OJ incu."T'.oen on e ourt 
to--issue· a·-.cautionary·instruction, although not requested to do so. 
Johann had an obvious motive to color his testimony 
against appellant so as to assure favorable treatment for 
himself and avoid exposure to the death penalty. The signifi-
cance of his testimony against appellant compelled a cautionary 
instruction to the jury. Johann was the state's chief witness, 
the only one who claimed to witness the shooting. His 
credibility was a crucial issue. 
Jury instructions must be construed as a whole. 
(See State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777 (1977) and cases cited 
therein) In appellant's case, no instructions were given 
regarding intoxication, no cautionary instruction was given 
and an instruction on flight was given where none was 
warranted by the evidence. 
On balance, the instructions were inadequate, mis-
leading and weighted in favor of the prosecution. That, in 
conjunction with the Court's restriction on appellant's 
direct testimony left the jury little alternative but to con-
vict for first degree murder. Thus, a reversal and remand 
for a new trial is appropriate. 
POINT V 
THE UTAH CAPITAL SENTENCING 
STATUTE, SECTION 76-3-207, 
u.c.A., DENIED APPELLANT DUE 
PROCESS BY SHIFTING THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF TO APPELLANT.AND BY 
FAILING TO REQUIRE PROOF OF 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
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The Utah capital sentencing statute, as construed by 
this Court in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977), requires 
only that the state prove " ••• that the totality of evidence 
of ··aggravating circumstances must therefore outweigh · the 
totality of mitigating circumstances'~ in order to sustain a 
verdict of death rather than life imprisonment. 
As applied to appellant's case, such a rule effectively 
eliminates the need for the state to produce any evidence of 
aggravation at the penalty phase inasmuch as the aggravating 
circumstances for purposes of the penalty phase are identical 
to those which apply in the guilt phase. In other words, the 
state must already have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the 
existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances 
listed in Section 76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated(l953), in order 
to achieve a verdict of guilty as to first degree murder. 
Therefore, as a practical matter, the burden of going 
forward shifted to appellant .to raise mitigation and the burden 
of proof shifted to appellant to produce sufficient mitigating 
evidence so as to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 
Such a result is a clear violation of appellant's 
right to Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. (See also In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 358, 25 L. Ed.2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970); 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 u. s. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 
2d 508 (1975}) 
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In Speiser v. Randall, 357 u. s. 513, 2 L •. Ed.2d 
1460, 78 S. Ct. 1332 (1958), the Supreme Court reversed 
California state judgments denying petitioners a property tax 
exemption for refusal to sign a loyalty oath on their tax 
returns. The Court held that the statute requiring the oath 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof of non-involvement 
in the proscribed advocacy to the taxpayer and violated the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 
In considering the appropriate burden and standard 
of proof applicable in a situation involving fundamental 
rights, the Court stated: 
There is always in litigation 
a margin of error, representing error 
in factfinding, which both parties 
must take into account. 'Where one 
party has at stake an interest of 
transcending value--as a criminal 
defendant his liberty--this margin 
of error is reduced as to him by the 
process of placing on the other party 
the burden of producing a sufficiency 
of proof in the first instance, and 
of persuading the factf inder at the 
conclusion of the trial of his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Due 
process commands that no man shall 
lose his liberty unless the Government 
has borne the burden of producing the 
evidence and convincing the fact finder 
of his guilt. 357 u. s. at 525-526. 
While acknowledging that Speiser v. Randall, supra, 
dealt with free speech in a civil context, appellant asserts 
that the concerns expressed in that case apply more force-
fully to a criminal defendant who stands convicted of first 
degree murder and who faces loss of his life, not the mere 
loss of his liberty. 
-22-
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The recent history of judicial authority in capital 
cases in this country has been characterized by a continuing 
concern by the appellate courts for narrowing the margin of 
error in the application of the death penalty. The thrust 
of all such cases since Furman v. Georgia, 408 u. s. 238, 
33 L. Ed.2d 346, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972), has been to limit 
and define those circumstances in which imposition of the 
death penalty is appropriate and to ensure, as much as 
possible, that the ultimate sanction will not be exacted· 
arbitrarily or discriminatorily. 
Appellant urges that the only proper standard of 
proof to be applied to the penalty phase is that of beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, the state should bear the burden of 
proving that the aggravating circumstances are of such pro-
portion that the mitigating circumstances do not consitute 
a reasonable or substantial doubt on the question of imposing 
a sentence of death. 
While the Utah homicide statute provides a bifurcated 
proceeding in capital felonies, it ought not to provide a 
bifurcated standard of proof which substantially lessens 
the burden to be borne by the state on the crucial issue of 
the life or death of a criminal defendant. 
In this instance, the trial court even evidenced a 
belief that the proper standard should be beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but noting that he must apply the preponderance 
standard set forth in Pierre, supra. 
. -23-
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In the recent case of State v. Brown, (Utah Supreme 
Court, No. 15481, filed February 7, 1980), Justice Stewart, 
in an opinion concurring in the result, reasoned that Sections 
76-1-501 and 502, u. c. A. (19?3), provide for the reasonable 
doubt standard to be borne by the state as to every element 
of a criminal offense, including the "attendant circumstances" 
as well. Thus, the language of those sections encompass the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding the 
commission of a homicide. The Utah penalty hearing statute 
does not rescind those general criminal provisions. 
As presently drawn and construed, the Utah penalty 
phase statute operates as a virtual mandatory death statute, 
clearly in violation of the decision in Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U. s. 280, 49 L. Ed.2d 944, 96 s. Ct. 2978 
(1976). The Utah penalty statute should be voided as both 
facially overbroad and defective as applied. 
Appellant contends that if this Court should reject 
the reasonable doubt standard argued for herein, then it must 
still find that the sentence of death in this case was 
inappropriate even under the preponderance standard. The 
sole significant aggravating circumstance relied upon by_the 
state was the dubious contention that the homicide was 
conunitted in the course of a robbery. The rr~tigating circum-
stances included the appellant's lack of any prior felony 
record, his relatively young age (under 40), the fact that 
he had been gainfully employed until a few months before the 
homicide and that he suffered some degree of mental impair-
-24-
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ment or depression as a result of an extended alcohol problem. 
Thus, the mitigating factors must surely have outweighed the 
aggravating circumstances and warrant, at the very least, 
a finding of prejudicial error as to the penalty proceeding. 
POINT VI 
UTAH'S CAPITAL SENTENCING STATUTES 
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY FAILING TO 
PROVIDE FOR THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW MANDATED BY DECISIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Section 76-3-206, U.C.A. (1953), provides for auto-
matic review by the Utah Supreme Court of all cases where a 
sentence of death has been imposed. Section 76-3-20/(3) 
allows for a revers.a:I.of the penalty phase where the Utah 
Supreme Court finds prejudicial error in that proceeding. 
Neither section defines the scope of review to be employed 
by this Court in deciding the appropriateness of the penalty 
imposed. Nor is there any requirement of specific findings 
in support of the penalty determination so as to provide an 
adequate basis for review. 
The U~ited States Supreme Court reviewed the Florida 
capital sentencing procedures in Proffit v. Florida, 428 U. S. 
242, 49 L. Ed.2d 913, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976). The Florida 
statute provided, in additio~ to setting forth the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances to be considered, for mandatory 
review by the Florida Supreme Court, requiring the Court to 
compare the circumstances of the case before it with those 
of other capital cases to determine the appropriateness of 
-25-
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